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Once upon a time, some thought that indicative conditionals could be effectively 
analyzed as material conditionals. Later on, an alternative theoretical construct has 
prevailed and received wide acceptance, namely, the conditional probability of the 
consequent given the antecedent. Partly following critical remarks recently ap-
peared in the literature, we suggest that evidential support—rather than conditional 
probability alone—is key to understand indicative conditionals. There have been 
motivated concerns that a theory of evidential conditionals (unlike their more tra-
ditional counterparts) cannot generate a sufficiently interesting logical system. 
Here, we will describe results dispelling these worries. Happily, and perhaps sur-
prisingly, appropriate technical variations of Ernst Adams’s classical approach al-
low for the construction of a logic of evidential conditionals with distinctive fea-
tures, which is also well-behaved and reasonably strong. 
 






According to a very influential view, the assessment of a conditional statement 
amounts to the assessment of the conditional probability of its consequent given 
its antecedent. Put forward by Adams in the Sixties and Seventies (see Adams 
1966, 1975), this idea has spread over the decades in many research areas in phil-
osophical logic and the philosophy of language (see Bennett 2003 and Edgington 
2020 for useful overviews), and ended up becoming a matter of substantial con-
sensus in the psychology of reasoning (see Evans and Over 2004, and Oaksford 
and Chater 2010). In addition, it served as a building block for popular logical 
systems (e.g., Hawthorne 1996, Leitgeb 2004, Thorn and Schurz 2014). 
The analysis in terms conditional probability may seem natural, but it is 
bound to miss a crucially important feature, namely the presence of a link of rel-
evance between antecedent and consequent in a compelling conditional statement 
(see, e.g., Douven 2008, Krzẏzanowska, Wenmackers, and Douven 2013, Skov-
gaard-Olsen, Singmann, and Klauer 2016, Spohn 2015). In this paper, we take 
this critical remark seriously and explore an alternative view. As we will see, the 
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notion of evidential support can be represented in a probabilistic framework and 
exploited to characterize a logic of conditionals—evidential conditionals—convey-
ing the idea that the antecedent provides evidence that the consequent holds.  
Probabilistic approaches have been popular among authors (such as Edging-
ton 1986, 2007) who firmly reject the idea of truth-conditions for non-material 
conditionals. Even though our work is consistent with this line of thought, we do 
not see our arguments here as incompatible with the view that conditionals have 
truth-conditions. Conversely, that view does not necessarily rob a probabilistic 
analysis of its legitimacy and theoretical potential, or so we believe (a similar ap-
proach is illustrated in different ways by Crupi and Iacona 2020, Égré, Rossi, and 
Sprenger 2021, and Douven 2016 himself). As a consequence, we take our treat-
ment of conditionals to be essentially neutral with respect to the question whether 
conditionals have truth-conditions. 
The paper is organized as follows. First, we outline a traditional approach to 
a probabilistic logic of conditionals (2.), following Adams’s (1975, 1998). Second, 
we explain why evidential support should play a critical role in a satisfactory anal-
ysis of indicative conditionals and we reconstruct Douven’s (2016) attempt to de-
velop this project (3.). We then address some key principles of conditional logic 
(4.). Here, we argue that the logic of evidential conditionals should differ from 
both the traditional account and Douven’s (2016) earlier attempt, and a logic with 
the desired features is presented accordingly (5.). We also analyze one specific 
case more closely (transitivity, 6.), and finally collect some brief concluding re-
marks (7.). 
 
2. Conditional Probability and Suppositional Conditionals 
Adams (1965) famously argued that the material conditional of classical proposi-
tional logic is not satisfactory as a model of the logical behavior of indicative con-
ditionals.1 Informally, Adams started from the idea that an indicative (simple) 
conditional can be assigned a degree of “assertability” (Adams 1966). The degree 
of assertability of “if a then b”, in turn, is strictly related to the conditional prob-
ability Pr(b|a), namely, the probability of the consequent on the supposition that 
the antecedent holds. For this reason, we will call suppositional this kind of condi-
tionals. For our purposes, a precise rendition of the ensuing probabilistic logic of 
conditionals can be given as follows. 
Syntax. Let P be a propositional language with a (finite) set of sentence letters 
p, q, r … and the usual connectives, ~, Ù, Ú, É. Formulas in P are called proposi-
tional formulas, and ⊨PL will denote classical logical consequence in P. We then 
define a language 𝑳⇒ including a further conditional symbol ⇒:  
– if a Î P, then a Î 𝑳⇒;  
– if a,b Î P, then a ⇒ b Î 𝑳⇒;  
– if a Î 𝑳⇒, then ~a Î 𝑳⇒.  
Note that 𝑳⇒ so defined leaves out embeddings and compounds of formulas 
with ⇒, but allows for (iterated) negation of such formulas.  
Semantics. For any standard probability function Pr over P, we define a valu-
ation function VPr : 𝑳⇒ ® [0,1] as follows:  
 
1 This negative conclusion is now popular. Williamson (2020) is a notable recent exception. 




– for every a Î P, VPr(a) = Pr(a);  
– VPr(a ⇒ b) = Pr(b|a), with VPr(a ⇒ b) = 1 in case Pr(a) = 0;  
– VPr(~a) = 1 – VPr(a).  
VP can be seen as representing the degree of assertability of sentences, includ-
ing simple non-material suppositional conditionals of the form a ⇒ b, and their 
(possibly iterated) negations. 
Validity. For a1, …, an, b Î 𝑳⇒, a1, …, an ⊨ b if and only if, for any Pr, 
∑ [1 − 𝑉"#(𝛼$)] ≥ 1 − 𝑉"#(𝛽)%& . In Adams’s (1975, 1998) terminology, the lack of 
assertability of a, namely 1 – VPr(a), is labelled uncertainty. So, according to the 
definition above, an argument is valid if and only if the uncertainty of the conclu-
sion cannot exceed the total uncertainty of the premises. More informally, one 
can say that in a valid argument a high degree of assertability of the premises 
implies a high degree of assertability of the conclusion (at least when the premises 
are not too many). Importantly, as Adams (1998: 151) points out, if a1, …, an, b 
Î P, then a1, …, an ⊨PL b if and only if a1, …, an ⊨ b, so the probabilistic notion 
of validity recovers all classically valid inferences for the propositional fragment 
of the language (also see Suppes 1966). Moreover, substitution of (classically) log-
ically equivalents also holds in this logic (Crupi and Iacona 2021). 
The logic of the suppositional conditional ⇒ is well understood (see, e.g., 
Leitgeb 2004, Ch. 3, and Crupi and Iacona 2021). In particular, ⇒ is known to 
validate the following ten important principles, where “>” denotes a generic con-
ditional, “T” stands for tautology, and the long arrow “⟹” indicates valid infer-
ence: 
1. Superclassicality (SC):  If a ⊨PL b, then a > b must hold 
2. Modus Ponens (MP): a > b, a  ⟹ b 
3. Conjunction of Consequents (CC): a > b, a > g  ⟹ a > (b Ù g) 
4. Disjunction of Antecedents (DA): a > g, b > g  ⟹ (a Ú b) > g 
5. Cautious Monotonicity (CM): a > b, a > g  ⟹ (a Ù g) > b 
6. Right Weakening (RW): If b ⊨PL g, then a > b  ⟹ a > g  
7. Limited Transitivity (LT): a > b, (a Ù b) > g  ⟹ a > g 
8. Rational Monotonicity (RM): a > b, ~(a > ~g)  ⟹ (a Ù g) > b 
9. Conjunction Sufficiency (CS): a Ù b  ⟹ a > b 
10. Conditional Excluded Middle (CEM): ~(a > b)  ⟹  a > ~b  
It is also well-known that the following principles are not valid for the suppo-
sitional conditional: 
11. Monotonicity (M): a > g  ⟹ (a Ù b) > g 
12. Transitivity (T): a > b, b > g  ⟹ a > g 
13. Contraposition (C): a > b  ⟹ ~b > ~a 
 
3. The Role of Evidential Support 
In order to assess the logical profile of ⇒ relative to principles (1)-(13), one of 
course has to keep in mind what a ⇒ b is meant to represent in the first place, that 
is, roughly, a statement that the consequent b is credible on the supposition that the 
circumstance described by the antecedent a obtains. Adams’s extensive work has 
rather effectively supported the adequacy of his logic relative to its target expli-
candum (see Adams 1965, 1998: Ch. 6), and we can take for granted his view 
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here. However, whether or not the assertability of indicative conditionals is fully 
captured by the theory of suppositional conditionals is a separate matter. Accord-
ing to McGee (1989), for instance, Adams’s theory “describes what English 
speakers assert and accept with unfailing accuracy” (485), but Douven (2008) has 
put forward a forceful counterargument. One of Douven’s key illustrations in-
volved a long series of tosses of a fair coin, and a comparison between two state-
ments: 
(*) If there’s a head in the first ten tosses, then there will be a head in the first 
1.000.000 tosses. 
(**) If Barcelona wins the Champions league, then there will be a head in the 
first 1.000.000 tosses. 
The probabilities of the consequent given the antecedent in (*) and (**) are only 
minutely different (and one can make them converge at will, by just increasing 
the number of tosses). And yet, Douven (2008) points out, (**) appears vastly less 
compelling than (*), which then raises a crucial problem.2  
Douven’s proposed solution is that the plausibility of a (simple, indicative) 
conditional is accounted for by the conditional probability of the consequent 
given the antecedent, but only on the additional proviso that the antecedent gives 
evidential support to the consequent. Following the standard probabilistic construal 
of evidential support or incremental confirmation (e.g., Earman 1992, Fitelson 
1999, Crupi 2015, 2020), this means that the conditional probability of the conse-
quent given the antecedent must be higher than the unconditional probability of 
the consequent itself. For our purposes, Douven’s own theory (developed in Dou-
ven 2016) can be specified as follows. 
Syntax. Let P be a propositional language as above. We then define a lan-
guage L® including a further conditional symbol ®:  
– if a Î P, then a Î L®;  
– if a,b Î P, then a ® b Î L®;  
– if a,b Î L®, then a Ù b, a Ú b, a É b Î L®;  
– if a Î L® then ~a Î L®.  
Language L® so defined allows for formulas with ® to appear in the scope 
of all other connectives, but still leaves out embeddings, i.e., formulas with ® 
occurring within the scope of ® itself. 
Semantics. For any standard probability function Pr over P and a threshold t 
(1/2 ≤ t ≤ 1) we define a valuation function V(Pr,t) : L® ® {0,1} as follows.  
– For every a Î P, VPr,t(a) = 1 if and only if Pr(a) > t; and VPr,t(a) = 0 otherwise.  
 
2 One reaction could be to acknowledge that (*) is largely more assertible than (**) while 
insisting that they are both true, thus semantically on a par (Douven 2016: 105-07, discusses 
a Gricean variant of this reply, and finds it eventually defective). However, there also exist 
truth-conditional treatments of conditionals making (*) true and (**) false on very plausible 
assumptions. A major example is the strict conditional view (see, e.g., Lycan 2001, Gillies 
2009, and Kratzer 2012), another one is the modal semantics for the evidential conditional 
presented in Crupi and Iacona (2020). So the relevance of Douven’s example is not limited 
to a non-propositional view of conditionals, and reliance on the example does not presup-
pose such a view. 




– VPr,t(a ® b) = 1 if and only if: (i) Pr(b|a) > t and Pr(b|a) > Pr(b), or (ii) Pr(a) 
= 0, or (iii) Pr(b) = 1; VPr,t(a ® b) = 0 otherwise.  
– VPr,t(a Ù b) = 1 if and only if VPr,t(a) = 1 and VPr,t(b) = 1; VPr,t(a Ù b) = 0 
otherwise. 
– VPr,t(a Ú b) = 1 if and only if VPr,t(a) = 1 or VPr,t(b) = 1; VPr,t(a Ú b) = 0 other-
wise. 
– VPr,t(~a) = 1 if and only if VPr,t(a) = 0; VPr,t(~a) = 0 otherwise. 
In Douven’s (2016) favorite terminology, VPr,t(a) = 1 and VPr,t(a) = 0 are 
meant to represent that a is acceptable / not acceptable, respectively, relative to 
probability distribution Pr and threshold t. So this framework embeds a version of 
so-called Lockean thesis for qualitative rational acceptability.  
Validity. For a1, …, an, b Î L®, a1, …, an ⊨ b if and only if, for any Pr and 
any t, if VPr,t(a1) = … = VPr,t(an) = 1 then VPr,t(b) = 1, too. According to this defi-
nition, an argument is valid if and only if it preserves rational qualitative accept-
ability. Substitution of (classically) logically equivalents also holds in this logic. 
Importantly, however, there exist straightforward cases in which a1, …, an ⊨PL b 
for a1, …, an, b Î P, and yet a1, …, an ⊭ b, so many classically valid inferences 
for the propositional fragment of the language are not recovered.  
 
4. A Second Look at Logical Principles 
Before presenting a discussion of ⇒ and ® and our own alternative proposal, it 
is important to emphasize our premises and current goals. First, here we will not 
challenge the idea that Adams’s theory captures the logic of the suppositional 
conditional as a target explicandum. However, and second, we concur with Dou-
ven that a non-material indicative conditional conveying evidential support de-
serves being modeled to account for certain reliable and important intuitions. In 
fact, the idea of evidential support clashes with some of the principles that are 
valid for the suppositional conditional. The principles (6) to (10), in particular, 
turn out to be increasingly questionable in this perspective. Let us discuss them in 
turn. 
Consider Right Weakening first, one of the most entrenched and technically 
powerful rules of conditional logic (see, e.g., Nute 1980: 52-3). At least since the 
debate between Hempel (1945) and Carnap (1962), it is clear that evidential sup-
port must fail so-called “special consequence condition”: take contingent a,b Î 
P, probabilistically independent for some Pr, then surely a will support a Ù b but 
not b—namely, Pr(a Ù b |a) > Pr(a Ù b), while Pr(b|a) = Pr(b)—despite the fact 
that, obviously, a Ù b ⊨PL b. Such failure of the special consequence condition 
arguably carries over to conditionals in the evidential sense. For an illustration, 
consider an uncertain election with five candidates, Anna, Barbara, Robert, Ste-
ven, and Ted, in strictly decreasing order of strength. The conditional “if Anna 
does not win the election (a), then a woman (Anna or Barbara) will win the elec-
tion (g)” is odd in terms of evidential support: in fact, finding out that a must 
make g less probable than it was otherwise, and thus provides evidence against g, 
if anything.3 Given the assumed ranking of the candidates, however, one might 
 
3 Proof: given that ~g ⊨PL a and 1 > Pr(a), Pr(~g) > 0, we have (by Bayes’s theorem) that 
Pr(~g|a) > Pr(~g), and therefore Pr(g|a) < Pr(g). 
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well consider “if Anna does not win the election (a), then Barbara will win (b)” 
compelling, for the antecedent might increase the probability of the consequent 
significantly. So, intuitively, we have a case where “if a then b” is compelling 
while “if a then g” is not, even if b entails g—which is against RW. 
Puzzling cases also arise concerning the related principle of Limited Transi-
tivity (LT entails RW, given SC, see Crupi and Iacona 2020). Here is an illustra-
tion. Suppose you don’t know who won Wimbledon in July 2018, and consider 
the following: 
a = ATP #2 player in early July 2018 (Nadal) didn’t win Wimbledon 2018 
b = ATP #1 player in early July 2018 (Federer) did win Wimbledon 2018 
g = ATP #3 player in early July 2018 (Zverev) didn’t win Wimbledon 2018 
Take the instance of LT consisting in the inference from “if a then b” and “if 
a and b, then g” to “if a then g”. The first premise, “if a then b”, is plausible: for 
someone who does not know the outcome, getting to know that Nadal didn’t win 
definitely is favorable evidence for Federer having been the winner.4 The second 
premise, “if a and b, then g”, is straightforward; given the obvious background 
assumption that only one player wins Wimbledon, the consequent g is implied by 
the antecedent, a and b. And yet the conclusion “if a then g” is completely un-
sound in terms of evidential support: if Nadal didn’t win, then the likelihood that 
a competitor such as Zverev did win must increase. As small as such increase may 
be, it definitely implies that a is not evidence in favor of g.5 In a case like this, 
assuming that conditionals convey evidential support, LT would license an infer-
ence from plausible premises to a very implausible conclusion.  
Rational Monotonicity is also a rather popular principle in the literature. 
Still, we submit that an evidential conditional “if a then b” does not license the 
conclusion that “if a and g, then b”, even under the additional proviso that “not: 
if a then not-g”. Adapting a well-known example (Pearl 1988: Ch. 2), suppose a 
house alarm (a) can be triggered (normally and appropriately) by burglary (b), 
but also (rarely and accidentally) by an earthquake (g). Then it makes sense to say 
that “if the alarm is activated (a), then burglary is happening (b)” in the evidential 
sense. But it would not be sensible to conclude that “if the alarm is activated (a) 
and an earthquake occurred (g), then burglary is happening (b)”. Yet the addi-
tional premise “not: if a then not-g” would also be sound in this case, for the alarm 
is surely not evidence against the occurrence of an earthquake (in fact, it is an 
indication in favor of that, although a feeble one). 
Conjunction Sufficiency, in turn, is a textbook case of a logical principle 
which should not be valid for a conditional implying evidential support. Two 
statements a and b can well jointly hold—say, “Mary went to the party last night” 
and “there was a full moon last night”—in absence of any connection of eviden-
tial support between them, so that “if a then b” (or “if b then a”, for that matters) 
is pointless in the evidential sense. For similar reasons, CEM is clearly ruled out. 
By denying, for instance, the conditional “if Planet Nine exists, then the Euro-
pean Union will collapse within 5 years” for lack of a connection of evidential 
support between antecedent and consequent one is in no way logically committed 
 
4 As a matter of fact, the 2018 winner of Wimbledon was Novak Djokovic, then ranked 
#21.	
5 Here again, Pr(g|a) < Pr(g) because ~g ⊨PL a (see footnote 1).  




to accept “if Planet Nine exists, then the European Union will not collapse within 
5 years”. Here again, an underlying formal relationship should be noted, because 
CEM entails CS (given MP, see Crupi and Iacona 2020). 
There is plenty of reasons, then, to think that the logic of a non-material con-
ditional conveying the idea of evidential support should depart from the logic of 
⇒. Douven’s theory accounts for the fact that principles (6)-(10) seem unsound as 
explained above, but at a very high cost: in fact, only one of principles (1)-(13) is 
validated by the conditional ®, namely SC (see Douven 2016, § 5.2). This is 
surely too much of a sacrifice. A failure of Modus Ponens, for instance, makes 
one doubt whether the very name ‘conditional’ is appropriate (see, e.g., van Fraas-
sen 1976, p. 277). We conclude that, while Douven’s project is important, his 
specific proposal suffers from significant limitations. The question naturally 
arises, then, if the idea of evidential support can be developed so that a more ro-
bust logic ensues. 
 
5. The logic of Evidential Conditionals 
Our proposal is to recover the role of evidential support by revamping a much 
older view, sometimes associated with the ancient Stoic logician Chrysippus (see 
Sanford 1989, p. 25, and Lenzen 2019, pp. 15-19, for discussion). According to 
this view, whether a (simple) conditional statement “if a then b” holds has to do 
with a relationship of incompatibility between the antecedent, a, and the negated 
consequent, ~b. To flesh this out in probabilistic terms, we will need a probabil-
istic measure of “incompatibility”. How should this be defined? First, it should 
be symmetric, so that the degree of incompatibility of a with ~b equals the degree 
of incompatibility of ~b with a for any given probability distribution Pr. Second, 
it should be maximal (that is, 1) in case Pr(a Ù ~b) = 0. Third, it should be mini-
mal (that is, 0) in case a and ~b are either probabilistically independent or posi-
tively correlated, namely, if Pr(a Ù ~b) ≥ Pr(a)Pr(~b). The simplest way to meet 
these constraints, it turns out, is to represent the degree of incompatibility between 




provided that Pr(a Ù ~b) ≤ Pr(a)Pr(~b), and 0 otherwise. For the limiting cases in 
which Pr(a) = 0 or Pr(b) = 1, and thus Pr(a)Pr(~b) = 0, the default option is to 
say that incompatibility is still maximal (i.e., 1) for then again Pr(a Ù ~b) = 0. 
Our proposal is just to equate the assertability of an evidential conditional “if a then 
b” to the degree of incompatibility between a and ~b thus defined. Appropriate 
connections with evidential support are thereby promptly recovered. First, as long 
as Pr(b) < 1, “if a then b” turns out to be assertable to some degree at least only 
if assuming a increases the probability of b, that is, only if Pr(b|a) > Pr(b). More-
over, “if a then b” is maximally assertable in case a makes b certain, that is, when 
Pr(b) < 1 and Pr(b|a) = 1. In fact, our measure of the incompatibility of a and ~b 
is identical to the measure of Bayesian confirmation as partial entailment of b by 
a investigated by Crupi and Tentori (2013, 2014). A probabilistic logic of eviden-
tial conditionals can now be spelled out accordingly, as follows. 
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Syntax. Let P be a propositional language as defined above. We then define 
a language 𝑳⊳ including a further conditional symbol ⊳:  
– if a Î P, then a Î 𝑳⊳;  
– if a,b Î P, then a ⊳ b Î 𝑳⊳;  
– if a Î 𝑳⊳, then ~a Î 𝑳⊳.  
Language 𝑳⊳ so defined leaves out embeddings and compounds of formulas 
with ⊳, but allows for (iterated) negation of such formulas. 
Semantics. For any standard probability function Pr over P, we define a valu-
ation function VPr : 𝑳⊳ ® [0,1] as follows.  
– For every a Î P, VPr(a) = Pr(a).  
– VPr(a ⊳ b) = 1 − "#(a	Ù	~b)"#(a)"#(~b), if Pr(a Ù ~b) ≤ Pr(a)Pr(~b), with VPr(a ⊳ b) = 
1 in case Pr(a) = 0 or Pr(b) = 1; otherwise VPr(a ⊳ b) = 0. 
– VPr(~a) = 1 – VPr(a). 
VP is meant to represent the degree of assertability of sentences, including simple 
non-material evidential conditionals of the form a ⊳ b (and their possibly iterated 
negations). 
 Validity. For a1, …, an, b Î 𝑳⊳, a1, …, an ⊨ b if and only if, for any Pr, 
∑ [1 − 𝑉"#(𝛼$)] ≥ 1 − 𝑉"#(𝛽)%& . Here, just like in Adams’s theory as specified 
above, an argument is valid if and only if the uncertainty (lack of assertability) of 
the conclusion cannot exceed the total uncertainty of the premises. So once again 
we can say that in a valid argument a high degree of assertability of the premises 
implies a high degree of assertability of the conclusion (at least when the premises 
are not too many). Just like in Adams’s theory, moreover, we have both a1, …, 
an ⊨PL b if and only if a1, …, an ⊨ b (for a1, …, an, b Î P) and the substitution of 
(classically) logically equivalents (Crupi and Iacona 2021). 
 É ⇒ ® ⊳ 
1. Superclassicality ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
2. Modus Ponens ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ 
3. Conjunction of Consequents  ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ 
4. Disjunction of Antecedents ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ 
5. Cautious Monotonicity ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ 
6. Right Weakening ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ 
7. Limited Transitivity ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ 
8. Rational Monotonicity ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ 
9. Conjunctive Sufficiency ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ 
10. Conditional Excluded Middle ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ 
11. Monotonicity ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ 
12. Transitivity ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ 
13. Contraposition ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓ 
Table 1: ✓ = valid; ✗ = invalid. The proofs for ⊳ are	in	Crupi	and	Iacona	2021.		
A summary table of the logical profile of our evidential conditional is dis-
played above, along with the suppositional conditional ⇒ and Douven’s condi-
tional ®. (The classical material conditional É is also included for comparison.) 
  




6. Shades of Transitivity  
The pattern of validities / invalidities in Table 1 illustrates that our evidential 
conditional ⊳ overcomes the weakness of Douven’s, and it also shows that its 
logic substantially differs from the logic of the suppositional conditional. A key 
feature in this respect has to do with Contraposition, which is validated by ⊳ but 
not by ⇒. Originally, Adams argued that Contraposition should fail for indicative 
conditionals (e.g., Adams 1975, pp. 14-15, and Adams 1998, § 6.3). However, the 
clearest and strongest counterexamples against Contraposition imply that a > b 
can convey an “even if a, b” (or “if a, still b”) construction in natural language 
(see Lycan 2001, p. 34, and Bennett 2003, pp. 32, and 143-144; also see Gomes 
2019). This means that such counterexamples become innocent for a non-material 
conditional connective which clearly rules out “even if a, b” as a target explican-
dum. And that, we submit, is just the case for ⊳ (see Douven 2016, p. 119, for an 
important discussion along the same lines).  
Other principles, as we know, are validated by the suppositional conditional 
but not by the evidential conditional. Our discussion of such cases is not complete 
yet. Above, we have provided intuitive motivations why principles (6)-(10) are 
naturally seen as invalid if a > b is meant to capture a relation of evidential sup-
port from a to b. One could, however, retain a general worry about the failure of 
Right Weakening and Limited Transitivity. Concerning the suppositional condi-
tional, what such principles tell us is that, while full transitivity fails, there are 
weaker forms of transitivity that survive in the logic. In fact, the validity of both 
RW and LT turn out to follow from the validity of Transitivity under unproblem-
atic assumptions. Concerning RW, posit b ⊨PL g and assume a > b. Given Super-
classicality, we then have b > g; and if Transitivity holds we immediately conclude 
that a > g. As for LT, we assume a > b and (a Ù b) > g; since a > a by SC, we 
derive a > (a Ù b) from the first assumption by Conjunction of Consequents, and 
again we conclude that a > g by Transitivity. In the case of Monotonicity and 
Cautious Monotonicity, the attractive feature of preserving a weaker but discern-
able variant of a more traditional logical principle is shared by ⇒ and ⊳. But given 
that ⊳ fails both RW and LT, a natural question is whether there exist any weak 
but non-trivial form of transitivity which is preserved in the logic of evidential 
conditionals. 
Interestingly, at least two of them exist. The first one is appropriately seen as 
a weakening of Right Weakening itself: 
Weak Right Weakening (WRW): If b ⊨PL g, then a > b, g > b ⊨ a > g. 
As a form of weakened transitivity, this inference rule demands something 
more from the second link of the transitive chain: not only has g to follow logically 
from b (as in plain RW), one must also have the “reverse” evidential conditional 
g > b as a separate premise. As shown by the derivation below, WRW holds given 
CM, C, and Substitution of Logical Equivalents (SLE), all of which are valid prin-
ciples for the evidential conditional (Crupi and Iacona 2020). 
Assume b ⊨PL g. 
1  a > b 
2  g  > b 
3  ~b > ~a   [1, C] 
4  ~b > ~g   [2, C] 
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5  (~b Ù ~g) > ~a  [3,4, CM] 
6  ~~a > ~(~b Ù ~g) [5, C] 
7  a > (b Ú g)  [6, SLE] 
8  a > g   [7, SLE, because b ⊨PL g] 
A symmetric maneuver generates another inference rule:6 
Weak Left Strengthening (WLS): If a ⊨PL b, then b >a, b > g  ⊨ a > g. 
In this case, the first link of the transitive chain is the target of a stringent demand: 
b has to follow logically from a, and the “reverse” evidential conditional b >a 
must be in place, too. As shown by the derivation below, rule WLS holds given 
CM and SLE.  
Assume a ⊨PL b. 
1  b > g  
2  b > a 
3  (b Ù a) > g  [1,2, CM]  
4  a > g   [3, SLE, because a ⊨PL b] 
Interestingly, one can also easily show that WRW and WLS are interderivable 
given C. We illustrate below by the right-to-left derivation. 
Assume b ⊨PL g 
1 a > b  
2 g > b 
3  ~b > ~a   [1, C]  
4  ~b > ~g   [2, C] 
5  ~g > ~a   [3, 4, WLS, because ~g ⊨PL ~b] 
6  a > g   [5, C] 
So in the logic of the evidential conditional, weakened forms of transitivity require 
that the first (WLS) or second (WRW) link in the chain be strengthened in a sim-
ilar way. This neat symmetry is broken, instead, in the logic of ⇒: due to RW, 
strengthening the second link with propositional logical entailment suffice to pre-
serve validity; due to the failure of Monotonicity, however, strengthening the first 
link with propositional logical entailment does not preserve validity. 
 
7. Conclusion 
A suppositional view understands a conditional as a statement that the conse-
quent is credible given the antecedent. In many cases, however, a stronger con-
nection between antecedent and consequent seems to be required, one that goes 
beyond a high conditional probability of the latter given the former. In fact, a 
number of suggestions broadly along these lines have flourished in recent times, 
spanning a variety of approaches (Andreas and Günther 2019, Berto and Özgün 
2021, Crupi and Iacona 2020, 2021, Raidl 2021, van Rooij and Schulz 2019, Rott 
2019). Here, we have suggested a new route to a logic of evidential conditionals, 
which hinges on the idea that the evidential support from a to b amounts to the 
 
6 Given SC, WLS can also be seen as a weakened form of another popular rule known as 
Conditional Equivalence: a > b, b >a, b > g  ⊨ a > g (see Adams 1998: 156, Krauss, 
Lehmann, and Magidor 1990: 179). 




degree of incompatibility between a and ~b, which also complies with earlier 
work in Bayesian confirmation theory (Crupi and Tentori 2013, 2014). We have 
then attached degrees of evidential support to non-material indicative sentences 
in a suitable formal language, and otherwise retained Adams’s definition of va-
lidity unscathed. The features of the resulting logical theory are attractive enough, 
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